Strategic Crossroads: Iran Between Russian Disappointment and Chinese Restraint
- Mickey Segall
- Jul 17
- 7 min read
July 17. 2023 0900
Executive Summary:
Iran-Russia: A Watershed Moment and Strategic Realignment?
The Israel-Iran war of June 2025 may represent a pivotal moment in Iran-Russia relations, marking a profound shift driven by deep Iranian dissatisfaction with Russia's lack of tangible military support during a critical crisis.
Moscow’s restrained response contrasted sharply with Tehran’s extensive prior support for Russia during its conflict in Ukraine, fundamentally challenging the assumptions underpinning their strategic partnership. This watershed event prompted Tehran’s strategic pivot toward China and is reshaping the trajectory of Iran’s future alliances. Moving forward, Iran is likely to pursue a careful balance, sustaining ties with Russia while expanding its strategic and military cooperation with China and other international partners (BRICS, SCO) to mitigate vulnerability and enhance national security.
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Russian Context and Iranian Expectations
Before the outbreak of war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, Tehran and Moscow had significantly deepened their strategic cooperation. Iran provided substantial military support to Russia during its war in Ukraine, supplying Shahed-136 one-way attack drones (OWA-UAVs) and reportedly short-to-medium-range ballistic missiles. Additionally, Russia consistently supported Iran’s nuclear rights on the international stage, reinforcing their mutual strategic interests. This relationship was further solidified by a comprehensive 20-year strategic cooperation agreement signed in early 2025, which covered joint investments in energy infrastructure, arms development, missile technologies, and preferential trade agreements, as well as alignment within international organizations such as the UN, SCO, and BRICS.
However, despite the broad scope of cooperation, the agreement notably lacked explicit mutual defense commitments, highlighting Russia's cautious approach toward direct security obligations to Iran. This omission became particularly critical during the June 2025 war, which saw Iran under unprecedented aerial bombardment from Israel and the United States. Iranian officials publicly expressed disappointment over Russia's weak diplomatic response and complete absence of military support. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei notably urged Russian President Vladimir Putin to "do more," reflecting Tehran’s deep dissatisfaction: "Iran has not been impressed with Russia’s support so far… wants Putin to do more.”
This limited reaction sharply contrasted with Iran’s proactive assistance to Russia in Ukraine, prompting widespread domestic criticism and a strategic reassessment within Tehran.
Domestic Iranian Debate on Future Cooperation with Russia
Russia’s conduct during the 2025 war with Israel ignited a sharp and wide-ranging debate within Iran over the value and reliability of the country’s strategic partnership with Moscow. Many Iranian lawmakers, analysts, and military figures expressed frustration that, despite years of Iranian support for Russia, including OWA-UAVs and missile supplies during the Ukraine war, Moscow failed to provide any meaningful assistance during one of Iran’s most vulnerable moments.
The debate centers around two main schools of thought. One camp argues for reducing dependency on Russia, citing a consistent pattern in Moscow's behavior of prioritizing its geopolitical interests, such as maintaining balanced ties with Israel and Gulf countries, over its commitments to Tehran. This camp advocates greater diversification of Iran’s strategic partnerships.
The other camp remains committed to the Russia partnership, viewing it as an indispensable pillar of Iran’s Axis of Resistance and international posture. Proponents point to even limited Russian diplomatic support during the war as evidence of a foundational alliance that should be unspoiled.
Iranian media and political analysts are increasingly supporting a pragmatic middle path: continuing cooperation with Russia in specific domains, while actively expanding strategic ties-particularly military and economic-with other non-Western powers, such as China, to mitigate Iran’s exposure and strategic vulnerability.
Iran’s Criticism of the Strategic Partnership Agreement
The 20-year strategic cooperation agreement faced significant domestic criticism within Iran. Critics argued that it disproportionately favored Russian interests, potentially undermining Iranian sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The absence of explicit mutual defense commitments drew particularly sharp criticism, exacerbated by Russia’s passive stance during the June 2025 conflict. Iranian analysts and politicians viewed this as indicative of Moscow’s reluctance to share security risks with Tehran, particularly after Tehran's substantial military assistance in Ukraine.
Furthermore, skepticism persisted regarding Russia’s reliability as a strategic partner due to its preference for balancing relations with the West and other regional actors, such as Israel and Gulf states, rather than firmly backing Tehran in moments of crisis.
Domestic Iranian Debate on Future Cooperation with Russia
Even before the Israel-Iran conflict, Iran’s 20-year strategic cooperation agreement with Russia faced mounting domestic criticism. Lawmakers, analysts, and segments of the Iranian press questioned whether the deal excessively favored Moscow, potentially compromising Iran’s strategic autonomy. Critics argued that the agreement lacked necessary safeguards for Iran—most notably, the absence of a mutual defense clause—leaving Tehran exposed in the event of a direct confrontation.
These concerns gained sharp urgency during the June 2025 war, confirming what many skeptics had long warned: that Moscow was unwilling to share security burdens with Iran, even after receiving extensive military support from Tehran during the Ukraine conflict. The war thus served to deepen and legitimize preexisting concerns over the asymmetric nature of the Iran-Russia alliance, and renewed calls within Iran to reassess the value and terms of the strategic agreement.
A balanced strategy, recommended by Iranian media and political analysts, involves maintaining cooperation with Russia while actively diversifying military and economic partnerships, especially with China and other non-Western allies.
Strategic Pivot to China: Context and Motivation
Driven by disappointment over Russia’s unfulfilled promises and passive support during the recent conflict, Iran intensified negotiations with China, its largest oil customer and a rising military partner. The June 2025 war starkly exposed vulnerabilities in Iran’s outdated air force, composed primarily of aging American F-4, F-5, and F-14 jets and Soviet-era MiG-29 aircraft. According to Iran’s Tasnim news agency, approximately 30% of the fleet was lost in airstrikes, highlighting the urgent need for modernization.
Iran’s fleet of MiG-29 fighter jets originates primarily from two sources. The majority were supplied directly by the Soviet Union in 1990 as part of a military cooperation package, while a smaller number were confiscated during the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraqi pilots flew their aircraft to Iran to avoid destruction by coalition forces. Iran retained and later integrated these aircraft into its air force, though most are now considered outdated and poorly suited to modern air combat.
Iran’s pivot toward China gained momentum following Russia's inability to deliver a previously finalized arms package, which included 50 Su-35 jets, Mi-28 helicopters, S-400 air defense systems, and Yak-130 trainers. Only a small fraction of the agreed-upon equipment arrived, prompting Tehran to seek alternatives from China, particularly the Chengdu J-10C multirole fighter jet. Iran’s interest was further driven by the J-10C’s proven operational performance, notably in conflicts involving Pakistan.
Details and Considerations Regarding the J-10C Acquisition
Negotiations for the J-10C jets, involving 36–40 units, accelerated following the lifting of U.S. sanctions on China's purchases of Iranian oil on June 24, 2025. Discussions initially began in 2015 but stalled due to payment disputes and UN arms embargoes, lifted in October 2020 in line with the JCPOA timeline. Talks notably advanced after Iran’s Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh visited China during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on June 26, 2025.
The J-10C, a 4.5-generation aircraft equipped with advanced AESA radar, PL-15 long-range missiles, and electronic warfare capabilities, is perceived by Iran as a more economically feasible and technologically credible alternative to the
Russian Su-35 jets. Despite its advantages, however, the J-10C still does not match the capabilities of Israel’s stealth F-35I fighters.
China’s Cautious Stance
Despite the promising outlook of Sino-Iranian military cooperation, Beijing maintains cautious ambiguity in its dealings with Tehran. China’s hesitation stems from complex and often conflicting geopolitical considerations. Foremost is its reluctance to provoke the United States amid strategic rivalry. Overt arms transfers to Iran risk entrenching perceptions of China as a destabilizing global actor and could invite diplomatic or economic retaliation from Washington.
Equally important is China’s investment in its relationships with Iran’s regional adversaries—particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These states are not only critical energy suppliers but also key partners in the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing is wary that supplying Iran with advanced weaponry could endanger these valuable partnerships and undermine its regional neutrality.
Additionally, China continues to adhere to its long-standing policy of non-interference in the internal or military affairs of other nations. Although applied pragmatically, this doctrine limits China’s willingness to engage in visible military alignments. Thus, prioritizing regional stability and economic predictability is a goal poorly served by open arms sales to Iran.
This cautious posture was reflected in the contradictory reports about the potential delivery of J-10C fighter jets to Iran. While some sources claimed the transfer occurred, both Chinese and Iranian officials denied it, underscoring Beijing’s desire to maintain strategic ambiguity and flexibility.
Strategic Outlook: Iran’s Likely Path Forward
In light of its recent experience with both Russia and China, Iran is likely to pursue a pragmatic and adaptive strategic posture. While disappointment with Moscow runs deep, especially in the wake of its failure to provide military support during the Israel-Iran war, Tehran still values Russia’s veto power at the UN and its support in nuclear negotiations. Similarly, while China has not provided overt military backing, it remains a crucial partner economically and diplomatically.
Iran will seek to extract technological and economic benefits from China, especially in the areas of dual-use technologies, drone components, and cyber capabilities. Tehran is expected not to insist on or condition its broader partnership with China on high-profile weapons deals that could place Beijing in a problematic regional or diplomatic position vis-à-vis the United States.
It is more likely that bilateral engagement will continue behind the scenes, under the guise of plausible deniability. An example of this dynamic was the explosion at Iran’s Bandar Abbas port on April 26, 2025, which killed dozens and injured hundreds. According to multiple reports, the blast originated from containers holding sodium perchlorate, a dual-use chemical used in solid missile fuel, allegedly shipped from China. While Iranian and Chinese officials denied any military linkage, Israeli sources claimed the shipment was part of a covert supply chain supporting Iran’s missile program. The incident highlighted the discreet, compartmentalized nature of Sino-Iranian security cooperation, particularly in areas too politically sensitive for formal acknowledgment.
At the strategic level, Iran’s foreign policy will continue to be driven by three key imperatives: preserving and advancing its nuclear program, maintaining its regional power projection via proxy networks and ideological export of the revolution, and securing stable revenue flows through oil exports, particularly via sanctions-resistant channels.
To achieve these goals, Iran recognizes that maintaining a working relationship with both China and Russia is essential, not out of ideological affinity, but as a means of shielding itself against Western diplomatic and economic pressure. Their presence on the UN Security Council and influence in the IAEA provide Tehran with critical diplomatic insulation.
Thus, Iran’s trajectory will likely aim to maximize strategic autonomy while leveraging Sino-Russian backing as a buffer against international isolation.
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