Houthi Missiles, Iranian Backing: Expanding Threat to the World's Shipping
- Mickey Segall
- Aug 6
- 8 min read
Executive Summary
Iran continues to emerge as the most dangerous proliferator of advanced weapons in the Middle East, actively supplying precision-guided missiles, cruise systems, drones, and air defense technology to a growing network of non-state proxies and, increasingly, to state actors. Through the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq and Syria, and armed groups in Gaza, Tehran has established a multi-front infrastructure capable of confronting Israeli, U.S., and allied interests with minimal direct exposure.
The Sayyad cruise missile, developed under Iranian guidance and revealed by the Houthis, is the latest example of this strategy in action. Yemen has become a live-fire laboratory for Iran's next-generation systems, cruise missiles, drones, and surface-to-sea strike platforms, tested in real combat against Western and Israeli-linked targets. The persistent missile and drone attacks launched from Yemen since late 2023 demonstrate not only ideological alignment but operational integration across Iran's Axis of Resistance.
This evolving threat landscape is no longer confined to Israel or U.S. military assets. Iran's proxy-enabled missile strategy now directly threatens one of the world's most vital arteries: the Red Sea shipping lanes. Through the Houthis, Iran has repeatedly disrupted global maritime trade, attacking commercial vessels of multiple nationalities and deterring freedom of navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb and the Arabian Sea.
Absent decisive, coordinated action to disrupt Iranian supply lines and degrade the missile infrastructure of its proxies, the threat to global trade, regional stability, and strategic deterrence will continue to escalate, extending well beyond the Middle East.
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Sayyad Missile: Rediscovered, Not New
On August 4, 2025, various media outlets re-circulated information about a long-range cruise missile known as "Sayyad" (Arabic: صيّاد, meaning "Hunter"), reportedly developed by the Iran-affiliated Houthi Naval Forces. The missile had previously been officially presented during military parades in Yemen in late 2023. According to media reports, the missile is a surface-to-sea cruise system capable of striking moving maritime targets with high accuracy and radar evasion, with an estimated range of approximately 800 kilometers. It is said to be launchable from anywhere within Yemeni territory toward targets in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean.
However, it is essential to clarify that this information is not new. The official Houthi announcement regarding the Sayyad missile was already made in late 2023, and the recent surge in attention is based solely on renewed media reporting. While these reports may suggest advancements in deployment readiness, there is currently no verified evidence that the missile has been used operationally.
Strategic Messaging and Proxy Escalation
The Sayyad missile is framed by the Houthis as a direct enhancement of Yemen's strategic deterrence and maritime defense capabilities, especially in light of their continued attacks on Israeli and Western-linked vessels in the Red Sea corridor. Although no confirmed use of the Sayyad in combat has been documented, its specifications and deployment posture suggest that such use may be imminent.
A key source reinforcing this assessment is a December 2023 article published by the pro-Houthi outlet Laamedia. The report outlines Yemen's declared policy to block vessels headed to Israeli ports unless humanitarian aid reaches Gaza. It presents Sayyad as a new strategic weapon to be deployed in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, quoting military officials and citing pro-Hizballah Lebanese daily al-Akhbar. The article links Sayyad's deployment to the broader Axis of Resistance, with public support voiced by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hezbollah. The renewed publication of this information in 2025 may signal either actual operational use or an imminent first deployment.
Iran has played a central role in the development, transfer, and operational use of Houthi missile capabilities. The Sayyad cruise missile, like other advanced systems in the Houthi arsenal, bears clear technical and structural similarities to Iranian platforms such as the Ghadir and Abu Mahdi. According to intelligence assessments and UN reports, Iran has supplied the Houthis with missile components, navigation systems, and training through the IRGC Quds Force.
In May-June 2025, Yemeni government-aligned forces intercepted a major Iranian weapons shipment reportedly destined for Houthi-controlled territory. The shipment, seized in the Gulf of Aden, contained hundreds of advanced missile components, including turbojet engines, radar-guided seeker heads, GPS/inertial navigation systems, warheads, and fuel modules. Several items matched the technical specifications of Iranian cruise missiles, and others were assessed to be components intended for local assembly of systems such as the Sayyad. The shipment also included drone parts, optical sensors, and manuals in Farsi, further confirming the direct Iranian supply chain.
This cooperation has enabled the Houthis to domestically assemble and deploy cruise missiles with extended ranges, radar-evading features, and precision strike capability. The Sayyad missile exemplifies this partnership: an Iranian-designed system, showcased in Yemen, likely manufactured with foreign-supplied components, and intended for deployment in a regional confrontation. It reflects Iran’s broader strategy of using its proxies to test and operationalize next-generation missile technology while avoiding direct attribution.
Yemen: Iran's Live-Fire Laboratory
Yemen serves a unique role in this proliferation network: it operates as a live-fire testbed for the latest Iranian military technology. Unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon (which operates under tighter Israeli deterrence) or the PMF in Iraq (which faces U.S. and Iraqi state scrutiny), the Houthis function in an active war zone with fewer political and security constraints. Iran uses this environment to field-test its cruise missiles, ballistic systems, Explosive Unmanned Surface vessels (USVs), and drones in real combat conditions.
This has included the ongoing launch of Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles and long-range UAVs from Yemeni territory toward Israel since the outbreak of the October 2023 war—attacks that have continued through 2024 and 2025, despite Israeli and U.S. intercepts. Before the China-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023, Houthi forces conducted numerous missile and drone attacks on Gulf states, including the September 2019 precision strike on Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities, which temporarily cut Saudi oil production by nearly 50%. According to multiple Western intelligence assessments and UN investigations, a portion of the cruise missiles and drones used in the attack were launched directly from Iranian territory, highlighting Tehran's willingness to conduct deniable but direct long-range strikes under the cover of proxy escalation, and the 2021 UAV attack on Abha International Airport.
In January 2022, the Houthis also targeted Abu Dhabi with ballistic missiles and explosive UAVs, killing three civilians and demonstrating their capacity to strike deep into Emirati territory. These operations illustrated both the range and lethality of Iran's proxy missile strategy well before the current escalation.
In addition, the Houthis have persistently targeted commercial vessels in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, using anti-ship missiles and one-way attack drones, serving both Iranian strategic goals and operational learning. Notably, the Houthis have demonstrated their ability to target and down advanced U.S. unmanned aerial systems in this environment. Since late 2023, they have successfully intercepted at least 12 MQ-9 Reaper drones ($30M each) -one of the most sophisticated ISR platforms in the U.S. arsenal-using Iranian-supplied surface-to-air missiles and adapted radar systems. These shoot-downs represent a significant leap in proxy capabilities, offering Iran both strategic leverage and valuable data on U.S. drone vulnerabilities.
The Red Sea as Launchpad and Laboratory
The Red Sea has thus become both a springboard and a laboratory. As a battleground, Yemen enables Iran to:
Observe and refine missile performance against naval targets,
Test radar evasion and electronic warfare under operational stress,
Evaluate the effectiveness of long-range launches from rugged terrain,
And assess air defense and counter-UAV capabilities against Western ISR assets.
In addition, Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, has leveraged its presence in Yemen to establish a growing intelligence footprint across both land and sea. This includes the deployment of Iranian surveillance ships, such as the Behshad and the Saviz, which have operated in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden under the guise of civilian cargo vessels. These ships have been used to gather electronic intelligence (ELINT), track maritime traffic, and relay targeting data to Houthi units ashore.
The integration of these maritime platforms with Quds Force advisors on the ground has enabled real-time coordination for missile and UAV strikes against Israeli, U.S., and Saudi-linked vessels, marking a sophisticated evolution in proxy warfare and battlefield intelligence. This fusion of naval surveillance and land-based targeting has allowed the Houthis to identify and strike commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea that were suspected of having Israeli ownership, management, or logistical ties, regardless of flag or crew nationality, demonstrating a deliberate effort to weaponize economic and maritime vulnerabilities as part of Iran's broader regional confrontation.
From Yemen to the Region and beyond
Strategic precedent strongly indicates that Iran's proxies function not only as operational arms but also as early adopters and battlefield testbeds for weapons systems that are later replicated and deployed across other conflict zones. This reflects a deliberate Iranian doctrine: testing and refining capabilities in proxy environments before exporting them to new theaters of conflict.
For example, EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators), first used in Lebanon by Hezbollah against Israeli forces during the 2006 Lebanon War, were subsequently adopted by Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq. There, these highly lethal roadside charges became one of the deadliest threats to U.S. and coalition forces during the Iraqi insurgency, facilitated by direct Quds Force involvement in training and technology transfer.
Similarly, cruise missiles and drones first launched from Yemen against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, such as the Quds-series and Samad platforms, have since been used against Israeli territory in 2024 and 2025. These systems have benefited from years of battlefield calibration in the Yemeni theater, enhancing their range, accuracy, and reliability.
In parallel, Iranian UAVs and loitering munitions, including the Shahed-131, Shahed-136, and Mohajer-6, developed initially and supplied to regional proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, were later transferred to Russia and employed extensively in the war in Ukraine. There, they have been used to attack Ukrainian infrastructure in sustained long-range campaigns, further validating Iran's model of iterative battlefield proliferation.
This pattern also applies to tactics and doctrine. Drone swarm operations first observed in the Red Sea have analogs in militia activity in Iraq and are consistent with IRGC operational planning in the Gulf and Levant.
Given this track record, the Sayyad missile should not be viewed as a one-theater system. If successfully deployed and refined by the Houthis, it is likely to be adapted and transferred to other Iranian proxies, whether Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, or state clients elsewhere. What is tested in Yemen often becomes a template for the next front in Iran's expanding regional arsenal.
Notably, Hezbollah itself successfully used an Iranian C-802-based missile to strike the Israeli Navy ship INS Hanit in 2006, a precedent for future anti-ship attacks carried out by other proxies. Intelligence reports further confirm that Hezbollah trainers have operated on the ground in Yemen and that some were killed in airstrikes since late 2023, reinforcing the operational and ideological alignment of Iran's proxy network.
Escalation Despite Pressure: Houthis Unshaken by Airstrikes
Despite Israeli airstrikes on Houthi military infrastructure, Yemen continues to escalate its involvement in the regional conflict. Israeli strikes have increasingly targeted economic and energy infrastructure, particularly oil depots and export terminals in Hudaydah and Ras Isa, and electricity facilities, yet the Houthi leadership persists in launching missiles at Israel and disrupting international shipping. For the Houthi leadership, the price is considered "acceptable," even as the civilian population suffers from fuel shortages, blackouts, and severe hunger. According to humanitarian reports, famine-like conditions have returned to multiple Yemeni regions. Nevertheless, the Houthis remain committed to their confrontation strategy, backed and supplied by Iran.
In light of these conditions, it is highly likely that in the short to medium term:
Yemen will continue to serve as a launchpad for Iranian strategic messaging and operations against Israel, Gulf States, and the West.
The Houthis will intensify efforts to disrupt global shipping in the Red Sea and beyond,
And the Sayyad missile, alongside other Iranian weapons, will either soon be used or is already being used covertly under a different designation.
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