No Help from Moscow: Iran’s Air Defense Doctrine After the War

Mickey Segall
Jul 21
7 min read

Updated: Jul 22

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force

July 21, 2025, 1900

Executive Summary

During the June 2025 war between Iran and Israel, Iran’s air defense infrastructure suffered extensive damage as a result of Israeli strikes targeting strategic radar and missile systems. In response, Iran rapidly deployed domestically produced systems to restore airspace coverage, including the Bavar-373, Khordad-15, and Talash platforms. Iranian officials emphasized that the integrated air defense network was not only restored but enhanced with upgraded and reconfigured assets. Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi stated that Iran had successfully reestablished full-spectrum aerial defense within days.

This experience reinforced Iran's longstanding policy of self-reliance in air defense, driven by its perception of unreliability among foreign suppliers, particularly Russia. Despite a 20-year strategic cooperation pact and earlier deliveries of the S-300, Moscow failed to provide either operational support or replacement systems during the conflict. Russian assistance was limited to technical advice and post-strike vulnerability assessments. Iranian military analysts noted that Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine, diplomatic caution, and previous patterns of delay made near-term deliveries of S-400 or other advanced systems unlikely.

In parallel to its military recovery efforts, Iran launched a focused diplomatic campaign aimed at reviving Russian defense commitments. On July 21, Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow, the day after Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani held a high-level meeting with President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin. Iranian officials described both meetings as efforts to "expand military cooperation." These visits reflect Tehran’s broader strategy to leverage diplomatic channels for post-war recovery, including securing advanced systems such as Su-35 fighters and S-400 batteries, and to reassert Iran’s strategic importance to Moscow.

At the same time, Iran is pressing Russia for continued political support in international forums, particularly on the issues of nuclear negotiations and sanctions relief. While these diplomatic overtures highlight Iran’s desire to reactivate Russian backing, they also underscore the limits of that relationship: as of late July 2025, no concrete defense deliveries have materialized. This reality further underscores Iran’s renewed emphasis on domestic defense production, strategic redundancy, and diversification of external partnerships—most notably with China.

While Iran has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt and respond to wartime damage through indigenous production, its air defense coverage remains uneven. Defending multiple high-value strategic sites—such as nuclear facilities and key oil and energy infrastructure—under conditions of sustained attack remains a challenge. Without foreign deliveries or accelerated domestic development (e.g., the under-construction Yavar‑313), Iran’s capacity to maintain high-density coverage across all vital regions in future conflicts may be limited.

Iran Replaces and Upgrades Air Defense Systems after Israeli Strikes

Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi, Deputy for Operations of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (Artesh), announced (July 20) that key air defense systems damaged during the recent "12-day Sacred Defense War" with Israel have been successfully replaced and upgraded, restoring full operational coverage of Iran’s airspace.

Speaking to Defa Press, Mousavi stated:"Following targeted strikes by the Zionist regime against our radar installations and surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, we acted swiftly to reinforce our defenses. The affected systems-primarily medium- and long-range SA units, including Mersad, 3rd Khordad, and associated radar arrays-were rapidly replaced with upgraded platforms and redeployed to strategic positions across the country."

He emphasized that Iran's integrated air defense network was not only restored but enhanced: "By combining old systems with advanced deployments—including point-defense batteries, mobile radar units, and long-range interceptors- we reestablished full-spectrum aerial coverage. These upgrades ensured continued deterrence and neutralized the enemy’s objectives."

Rear Admiral Mousavi also accused the United States and NATO of directly supporting the Israeli offensive through intelligence-sharing and strategic coordination:"This aggression was not solely an Israeli operation. It was enabled by months of Western support. We hold the United States complicit in these crimes."

He concluded by praising the Iranian people for their unity and resilience: "Just as in the eight-year Sacred Defense, this nation once again proved that no aggressor can bend Iran to its will."

Iran’s Air Defense Independence and Russian Inaction

Both before and after the June 2025 war, Iran has placed increasing emphasis on developing self-reliant air defense capabilities. This stems in part from lessons learned during the Iran-Iraq war and a desire to reduce dependency on foreign suppliers, particularly Russia. Over the past decade, Iranian defense industries have successfully developed and deployed a wide range of indigenous systems, including the Bavar-373, Khordad-15, and Talash (see the appendix), designed to counter cruise missiles, UAVs, and fifth-generation aircraft.

While Russia’s S-300 systems were delivered in previous years, skepticism has grown in Tehran regarding Moscow’s willingness or ability to provide more advanced platforms, such as the S-400. Iran's military leadership has increasingly signaled that the future of its air defense architecture will rely on domestic innovation, operational redundancy, and flexibility tailored to its unique threat landscape.

Iranian officials, both military and political, have privately expressed frustration with Russia’s failure to provide real-time support or replacement systems during the war. Despite a long-term defense cooperation pact and intelligence sharing, Russian aid was limited to post-strike consultations, and even public statements of support were quickly retracted. According to defense analyst Farshid Bagherian, Moscow is unlikely to even assist in refurbishing or replacing Iran’s damaged S-300 systems. No delivery of S-400s or electronic warfare systems was confirmed before, during, or after the June conflict, despite prior suggestions to the contrary.

In the recent week, Tehran reinforced its diplomatic outreach to Moscow, seeking to translate political alignment into tangible military support. Ali Larijani, a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, traveled unexpectedly to Moscow on July 20 and met with President Putin, a meeting confirmed by the Kremlin spokesman amidst broader discussions of regional security and Iran’s nuclear file.

The following day, Iran’s Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh held discussions in Moscow with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, reportedly focusing on “expanding military cooperation.” Nasir Zadeh also participated in Larijani’s meeting in the Kremlin, signaling Iran’s attempt to align its defense-industrial interests, managed by his ministry, with high-level political diplomacy.

Effectiveness of Iran’s Domestic Air Defense Response

During the 12-Day War, Israeli strikes caused significant damage to Iran’s integrated air defense infrastructure. High-value assets, including fixed radar stations and mobile launchers, were disabled in central and southwestern Iran. However, Iranian commanders claimed that critical air defense functions were restored within 72 hours through the use of domestically manufactured systems and pre-positioned redundant units.

Iran’s ability to restore air defense coverage without foreign assistance, particularly from Russia, highlighted both the strengths and limitations of its self-reliance. While platforms like the Bavar-373 and Khordad-15 allowed Iran to maintain a functional defensive posture, comprehensive, high-density protection of sensitive infrastructure remains a significant challenge.

Strategic sites such as nuclear facilities (e.g., Natanz and Fordow) and critical oil and power infrastructure require simultaneous, multi-layered coverage. Although Iran’s domestic industry can maintain adequate coverage during peacetime or limited conflict, it may struggle to defend multiple fronts under sustained, high-precision attack.

Assessment of Future Russian Support

The likelihood of Russia supplying Iran with advanced air defense systems—such as the S-300PMU-2, S-400, or high-end radar platforms—in the near to medium term is low. Several factors undermine the prospect of timely Russian assistance:

Operational Constraints: Russia’s military-industrial base is heavily burdened by the ongoing war in Ukraine. Platforms like the S-400 are in high demand for Russian use and are not readily available for export to other countries.
Diplomatic Caution: Despite rhetorical support for Iran, Moscow has consistently avoided direct involvement in Iranian-Israeli hostilities. Supplying Tehran with robust SAM systems so soon after a high-profile conflict would likely provoke backlash from the U.S., Israel, and Gulf states. Moscow may therefore delay or limit deliveries to maintain diplomatic flexibility.
Iranian Self-Reliance Doctrine: Tehran has doubled down on its commitment to developing domestic platforms such as Bavar-373 and the under-construction Yavar-313, which may also reflect growing frustration with Moscow’s unreliability.
Historical Precedent: Following the expiration of the U.N. arms embargo in 2020, Iran anticipated the delivery of Su-35 fighters and additional S-300 components. None were delivered. This history further reinforces skepticism regarding future promises.

Although limited technical assistance (e.g., software updates, radar optimization, or spare parts) may still be possible, the delivery of complete, next-generation air defense systems from Russia appears unlikely in the short term and uncertain in the medium term. Iran is expected to continue prioritizing its indigenous capabilities while quietly lobbying Moscow, but with reduced expectations and an eye toward alternative partners such as China.

Appendix: Iranian Air Defense Systems Overview

System Name	Type	Detection Range	Engagement Range	Max Altitude	Targets	Notes
Bavar-373 (باور-۳۷۳)	Long-range SAM	450 km (radar), 300 km (Sayyad-4B missile)	~300 km	~27–30 km	Ballistic missiles, stealth aircraft, cruise missiles	Indigenous system comparable to Russian S-300; uses phased-array AESA radar and Sayyad-4B missiles.
Khordad-15 (۱۵ خرداد)	Medium–long-range SAM	85 km (stealth aircraft), 150+ km (conventional)	45–75 km (est.)	~27 km	Stealth fighters, UAVs, PGMs	AESA radar; 5-minute deployment; 6-target simultaneous tracking with 2 missiles per target.
Talash (طلاش)	Medium-range SAM	~150 km (with Sayyad-2/3)	~100 km	~25 km	UAVs, aircraft, cruise missiles	Designed as a flexible mobile system, fires Sayyad-2/3 missiles; supports integrated layered defense.
Mersad (مرصاد)	Short–medium-range SAM	80–100 km	~40–50 km	~18–20 km	Aircraft, UAVs, drones	Based on a reverse-engineered U.S. HAWK system, deployed for fixed-site defense.
Zubin / Tabas / Herz-9	Short-range mobile systems	~50–70 km	~25–30 km	~10 km	UAVs, PGMs, cruise missiles	Point-defense and tactical systems complement larger systems for lower-tier protection.
Yavar-313 (یاور-۳۱۳)	Under development – likely long-range	Unknown	Target: 200–300 km (est.)	Unknown	High-altitude threats	Claimed to be Iran’s future indigenous equivalent to S-400; details remain limited.
Qaher-313 (UAV variant) (قاهر-۳۱۳)	Stealth UAV (converted from manned)	Reconnaissance/surveillance	Precision strike (unclear range)	–	Ground targets, ISR missions	Originally unveiled as a stealth jet, repurposed into a drone platform for ISR and strikes.