Iran’s No-Compromise Response to Protests and Implications for Israel

January 6, 2026

A Soleimani banner was torched in Qazvin during the ongoing protests on the sixth anniversary of his death

Executive Summary

Following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s January 3 speech, the regime’s public line has shifted from managing an economic protest wave to an explicitly security-driven posture: officials now distinguish between “protesters” and “rioters,” while senior regime officials signal punitive, coercive enforcement against the latter. This rhetorical hardening is reinforced by the judiciary and IRGC messaging that frames unrest as organized, violent, and foreign-exploited, creating political cover for a more forceful crackdown.

If the regime perceives a serious threat to its survival, it will not hesitate to apply maximum coercive power to suppress the unrest. U.S. warnings may shape optics and timing, but Iran’s actual response will be driven primarily by the scale, persistence, and perceived lethality of the protests, not by Washington’s stated position.

Implications for Israel rise in parallel with the crackdown narrative. Tehran is amplifying “foreign hand” framing that explicitly centers Israel, including high-profile claims of Mossad-linked involvement, which serve to delegitimize unrest and justify harsher internal measures. If protests broaden and intensify, the regime may further externalize the crisis by escalating anti-Israel messaging and showcasing proxy readiness to rally cohesion and reframe dissent as collaboration with an enemy, increasing escalation and miscalculation risk.

Since December 28, 2025, protests that began among Tehran shopkeepers and bazaar merchants have continued to ripple outward, with periodic street gatherings and localized clashes reported across multiple provinces. Iranian state outlets now emphasize an uneven picture: they claim many provinces were calmer on January 5 to 6, 2026, while portraying the remaining flashpoints as security incidents driven by “rioters” rather than authentic economic protest.

Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRANA) reported on January 5, 2026, on its “ninth day” report, at least 29 people have been killed (including two affiliated with law enforcement/security forces), and at least 64 protesters have been injured. Protests have been recorded in 257 locations across 88 cities in 27 provinces; over the past 24 hours, gatherings were reported in (among others) Tehran and nearby towns (e.g., Parand), and a wide spread of provincial cities including Ilam-area towns, Arak/Hamedan/Semnan (central-west/central), northern cities (e.g., Amol, Lahijan, Babol, Sari), and southern/western hubs (e.g., Marvdasht, Sanandaj).

Higher-intensity flashpoints (based on reported live fire and confirmed fatalities/injuries) include Malekshahi (reported live ammunition with three killed and 12 injured) and cities with confirmed deaths, such as Azna, Marvdasht, and Qorveh.

Iranian official/inside-Iran reporting does not provide a comprehensive nationwide toll and tends to highlight security-force losses; for example, ISNA reported one Basij member killed and 13 injured in an incident in Kuhdasht, without presenting overall protest fatalities.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered his speech on January 3, 2026, during a ceremony at the Imam Khomeini Hussainiyah in Tehran. The speech occurred on the sixth anniversary of the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani (targeted by a US drone strike in Iraq on January 3, 2020). It coincided with the birth anniversary of Imam Ali. Khamenei acknowledged economic grievances but blamed foreign interference: "Legitimate protests are valid, but unrest serves the enemy... The enemy never remains idle; they exploit every opportunity…Rioters must be put in their place."

He emphasized that Iran's merchant class (bazaar traders) is loyal to the Islamic Republic, and their complaints about currency depreciation and exchange rate instability are genuine economic concerns, not political opposition.

On Trump's threat, the Leader said, "We will not give in to them. With reliance on God and confidence in the people's support, we'll bring the enemy to its knees… The Iranian nation stands firm against an imposed war, just as it will stand firm against an imposed peace, and this nation will not surrender to anyone in the face of imposition.

Khamenei: Rioters must be put in their place.

Following Khamenei's speech (January 3), over the past 48 hours, the regime’s messaging has sharpened around a protester vs rioter distinction, paired with a shift toward punitive deterrence. The Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei publicly stressed that “this time” there will be no mercy for “rioters,” explicitly linking harsher treatment to claimed open support for unrest by the United States and Israel. He added that the Attorney General and prosecutors should identify the main instigators who direct the riots in the field, provide them with tools and equipment, and prosecute them quickly.  In parallel, the IRGC’s Hazrat-e Abolfazl Unit in Lorestan issued a statement declaring the “appeasement period” over.

On the security dimension, Iranian outlets have elevated a narrative of armed and organized violence. Tasnim described masked armed elements in Ilam Province (Sarableh) and explicitly referenced the use of firearms. IRNA and police-linked reporting also highlighted arrests and seizures of “riot” tools, including Molotov cocktails and improvised grenades, framing these as planned sabotage rather than protest. These themes are reinforced by Tasnim’s and Fars-linked reporting around Malekshahi (Ilam Province), including claims of an “Israeli-made grenade” and fatalities, used to support the regime’s foreign hand narrative.

Iranian senior responses to Trump’s warning

Senior Iranian officials framed Trump’s remarks as illegal interference and attempted to raise the perceived cost of any U.S. action. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, speaking on January 3, 2026, acknowledged economic grievances but blamed foreign exploitation of unrest, warning that “rioters must be put in their place,” while stressing Iran would not surrender under “imposed war” or “imposed peace.”

The deterrence line was echoed across institutions. Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf warned that U.S. “centers and forces in the region” would be treated as legitimate targets if Washington interferes. SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani warned that interference would trigger region-wide disorder and closed with a direct warning to “watch your soldiers.” Mohsen Rezaee similarly warned of consequences against U.S. bases and regional stability, using “this time is different” framing.

From the foreign policy lane, Iran amplified the “dangerous and irresponsible” framing and tied it to readiness and retaliatory capability. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described Trump’s posture as “law of the jungle,” repeated the protest/riot distinction, and paired it with a warning posture about Iran’s armed forces. Ali Shamkhani, the Leader’s representative on the Defense Council, warned that any “interfering hand” approaching Iran’s security would be “cut off before it arrives.” Speaker of Parliament Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf: “centers and forces in the region” are presented as legitimate targets in the event of U.S. interference; emphasis on deterrence-by-cost.

Speaker: US centers and forces in the region are our legitimate target

Iranian messaging also leveraged Venezuela as a reinforcing example of “U.S. illegality,” highlighting condemnation of the reported kidnapping of Maduro and portraying it as proof that Washington threatens sovereignty while claiming to “save” people.

Israel is framed as a function of continued unrest.

As unrest persists, the regime is actively building a foreign direction storyline centered on Israel. A key indicator is Tasnim’s claim that FARAJA (The Police Command of the Islamic Republic) arrested a Mossad-linked operative allegedly embedded among the unrest participants in Tehran. Tasnim publishes excerpts of a purported “confession” describing recruitment via Instagram/Telegram, paid tasking, and operational guidance, and says the investigation is ongoing.

Police arrested a Mossad-linked operative allegedly embedded among unrest participants in Tehran, presented via a confession-style narrative involving recruitment through social media and paid tasking. This claim is not independently verifiable from the reporting. Still, its signaling value is high: it helps the state argue the unrest is not authentic, justify stricter measures, and normalize the “Israel/Mossad hand” frame.

If domestic unrest broadens and intensifies, Tehran is likely to lean harder into externalization, including sharper Israel-blame messaging, more frequent “Mossad” arrest claims, and publicized weapons caches. It supports the regime’s effort to portray protests as foreign-directed and non-authentic, attempting to polarize society by recasting dissent as collaboration with an enemy, legitimizing harsher security/judicial measures, and elevating the “Israel/Mossad hand” narrative that can also facilitate diversionary externalization.

Iranian police claim they arrested a Mossad-linked operative embedded among protesters in Tehran.

Tehran could try to shift the agenda by escalating confrontation rhetoric against Israel or showcasing proxy readiness, aiming to rally nationalist cohesion and reframe dissent as aiding the enemy. This is consistent with current “U.S. plus Zionist regime” (“Zionist plot”)  blame patterns in regime-aligned commentary.

Two Israel-facing dangers rise as the protest cycle continues: first, increased risk of diversionary action (proxy signaling, calibrated escalation) designed to redirect attention and unify domestic constituencies; second, greater exposure to manufactured attribution, meaning Tehran may claim Israeli involvement to justify harsher internal measures and potentially retaliate in ways that expand regional risk.

Larijani wrote on his official X (Twitter) account: "With the positions taken by Israeli officials and Trump, the behind-the-scenes story has become clear. We distinguish the positions of protesting shopkeepers from destructive agents, and Trump should know that American interference in this internal matter equals the disruption of the entire region and the destruction of American interests…The American people should know that Trump started this adventurism. Be careful of your soldiers."

For now, Iran’s leadership may prefer lower-visibility suppression early on to avoid widening participation and to reduce international pressure. Still, if the regime perceives an existential threat, it has repeatedly shown that it will use decisive force. Khamenei’s own framing draws a hard line: officials should talk to “protesters,” but “there is no benefit to talking to rioters,” and they “must be put in their place.” Thus, once Khamenei publicly endorsed firm handling of “rioters,” the system’s incentive structure shifts toward deterrence and rapid incapacitation of organizers.

In that context, the more relevant driver of Iran’s response is the scale and trajectory of the unrest and the regime’s threat perception, not Washington’s posture-the last 48 hours of senior messaging point toward a coercive turn.

Reuters on January 5, 2026, reported that Iranian leadership sees Trump’s threat to intervene on behalf of protesters as complicating their efforts, with added anxiety after the U.S. seizure of Venezuela’s Maduro. Reuters. This likely affects optics and timing. It may increase reliance on arrests, intimidation, and selective force. It does not remove the regime’s core willingness to escalate sharply if survival is on the line, as the public statements by Khamenei, Ejei, and Mousavi indicate