IRAN WEEKLY UPDATE — Diplomacy, Military Posture, and Internal Security

February 8, 2026 10:21

Iran is seeking to deter a U.S. strike while preserving strategic leverage: Tehran is pairing an outward-facing negotiation track (Oman/Muscat and regional diplomacy) with an inward-facing security campaign that treats protest, sabotage, and dissent as an intelligence-led ‘hybrid war’ problem. The result is a posture that aims to extract sanctions relief and political de-escalation without conceding on enrichment, missiles, or Iran’s regional role.

Notably, the nuclear–missile agenda has crowded out the regime-change/protest narrative in regional coverage and diplomatic bandwidth. This shift benefits Tehran: it reframes internal unrest as a secondary issue, allows the regime to claim national unity during the sensitive Ten-Day Fajr celebrations (Dahe-ye Fajr: 12–22 Bahman 1404 / 1–11 Feb 2026), and expands the space for continued coercive repression with reduced external pressure. Dahe-ye Fajr (the Ten-Day Dawn) commemorates the critical period from Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Iran on February 1 until the final victory of the Iranian Revolution on February 11 (22 Bahman) in 1979.

Iranian military officials continue to signal that any U.S. ‘adventure’ will impose ‘high and irreparable’ costs across the region, while emphasizing that Tehran is not seeking war. This messaging is intended to deter kinetic action by raising the perceived cost to U.S. basing, maritime chokepoints, and escalation control.

On internal security, Iranian outlets are reinforcing a standard coercion narrative: ‘Unknown Soldiers of Imam Zaman’ (MOIS) and IRGC-linked channels publicize CT operation s arrests, seizures of weapons, and claims of Mossad training to justify rapid prosecutions and to deter future mobilization. The regime is signaling that it will pay any domestic political cost to prevent renewed waves of protest.  

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1) DIPLOMATIC / NEGOTIATION TRACK

Tehran’s diplomacy over the past week has been structured around two objectives: (1) sustain indirect talks with Washington in Oman while rejecting ‘negotiations under threat’; and (2) mobilize regional interlocutors to discourage a U.S. strike by highlighting escalation risks to Gulf security, shipping, and broader regional stability.

Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi has publicly framed the Muscat channel as workable so long as threats are removed, describing the first round as a ‘good start’ and signaling flexibility on enrichment levels while refusing ‘zero enrichment’ and opposing any export of enriched uranium. He has reiterated that Iran’s missile program is outside the framework of negotiations.

In parallel, Araghchi’s Doha engagements (the Al Jazeera Forum and related interviews) were used to internationalize Tehran’s framing: Iran claims it does not seek a regional war but warns that any American attack would dominate the agenda and trigger a response. He also linked regional security to the Palestine issue, portraying Israel as an actor operating ‘above the law’ and expanding instability across borders.

Iranian reporting also highlights outreach to multiple regional capitals—including Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, the UAE and others—aimed at aligning messaging against external intervention. The implicit deterrent message in this outreach is consistent: escalation will not remain bilateral and will endanger regional economic interests and maritime security. Sources

Messaging discipline is evident across Iranian outlets: Tehran stresses its willingness to pursue diplomacy ‘with dignity’ while denying that U.S. military posturing is intimidating. In Iranian media framing, the core demand is respect for Iran’s ‘established rights’-with enrichment treated as non-negotiable, and sanctions relief as a central expectation.

2) MILITARY THREAT POSTURE AND CAPABILITY SIGNALING

Iran’s deterrence messaging emphasizes a ‘cost imposition’ approach: officials and pro-IRGC channels consistently warn that any U.S. strike would expand the scope of the crisis across the entire region and impose high costs on ‘planners and supporters.’ The stated target set typically includes regional U.S. bases, naval forces operating near Iran, and (implicitly or explicitly) Israel.

Iranian channels amplify asymmetric maritime options—mines, swarms of fast boats, and one-way attack drones—while presenting these capabilities as a credible means to threaten shipping corridors and U.S. naval freedom of maneuver. This is frequently paired with political messaging that Tehran is not the initiator of war but will respond decisively. Source:

Ballistic missile and drone signaling remains central. Iranian reporting highlights the Khorramshahr-4 (also referred to as ‘Kheibar’) as a long-range system with high destructive power. At the same time, other outlets continue to normalize the use of one-way attack drones (Shahed series) and armed ISR drones (Ababil family) as scalable tools for saturation and cost-imposition. Sources: Defa Press – Khorramshahr‑4 framing (Telegram); Khabaronline – Khorramshahr‑4 overview; Tasnim – Shahed‑136 overview; Defa Press – Ababil‑5 features

Selected Iranian-Reported Technical Snapshot (claimed/press-reported)

System	Role in messaging	Reported/claimed performance (Iranian reporting)	Iranian source (link)
Khorramshahr‑4 (‘Kheibar’)	Ballistic deterrence; strategic/base target threat	Iranian outlets describe a ~2,000 km-class system; additional design details (propellant, payload) vary by outlet and are presented as claimed capabilities.	Khabaronline; Farar u
Shahed-136 (one‑way attack drone)	Saturation/attrition tool; scalable strike narrative	Iranian reporting describes delta‑wing loitering munition; outlets cite ranges in the ~2,000–2,500 km class (claims vary by source/version).
Ababil‑5 (armed ISR / multi‑role UAV)	Armed surveillance/strike; flexible, lower-cost tool	Defa Press reporting cites (claimed) max speed ~210 km/h; endurance ~12 hours with payload; ceiling ~18,000 ft; operational radius ~300 km (and higher endurance claims in exercises).	https://english.iswnews.com/24215/military-knowledge-ababil-5-irans-newest-drone-achievement/

Iranian outlets and pro-IRGC channels also circulate claims about neutralizing layered U.S. defenses and targeting U.S. warships in the region. These narratives typically frame U.S. and Israeli threats as psychological warfare that will fail because Iran’s leadership and armed forces ‘do not fear’ escalation. (Source: Defa Press – targeting U.S. warships/missile penetration claims)

3) INTERNAL SECURITY: SUPPRESSION, ‘MOSSAD AGENT’ NARRATIVE, AND DETERRENCE BY PUBLICIZATION

Internal security reporting over the past week continues to depict the protest environment as a foreign-directed terror campaign. The label set-‘terrorist teams,’ ‘riots,’ ‘thugs,’ and ‘Mossad-trained operatives’—is used to justify arrests, expanded surveillance, and the normalization of coercive methods including staged media products and public ‘confessions’.

A prominent example circulated by IRGC-linked channels claims the death of Sadegh Ashtari, described as the leader of a ‘terrorist team’ tied to an attack on Police Station 126 in Tehranpars, with additional arrests of alleged accomplices. The narrative explicitly alleges Mossad training in Erbil, Iraq—an attribution designed to delegitimize dissent as external subversion rather than domestic grievance.

Provincial messaging mirrors this approach. In East Azerbaijan, ‘Unknown Soldiers of Imam Zaman (MOIS) claimed a broad operation identifying ‘planning and field networks’ across Tabriz, Basmenj, Sahand, and Miyaneh; the statement highlighted arrests of MEK members, monarchist elements, and ‘newly emerged groups,’ and claimed the seizure of 220 illegal firearms in Jolfa. Regardless of the accuracy of these claims, the operational purpose is clear: deterrence by publicization and intimidation of would‑be organizers.

Judiciary-aligned messaging reinforces regime durability and frames repression as ‘justice’ and revolution protection. This provides ideological cover for continued prosecutions and sustained security control during Dahe‑ye Fajr.

ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK

Iran’s current approach can be summarized as ‘diplomacy under deterrence’: Tehran is trying to keep the Oman channel alive while demonstrating-through explicit threats, weapons signaling, and ‘hybrid war’ narratives—that it can impose severe costs if attacked. The combination is intended to force U.S. restraint and extract concessions without appearing to retreat.

At the same time, the nuclear–missile file has displaced protest and regime-change discourse in the immediate crisis framing. This shift effectively advantages Tehran: it reduces external focus on repression and helps the regime portray domestic dissent as marginal and foreign-influenced. The internal instability risks have not disappeared; they have been politically deprioritized while the regime continues to harden and sharpen its coercive toolkit for future waves.

Iranian public messaging increasingly emphasizes that any U.S. action would trigger a regional ‘ring of fire’ dynamic (shipping, bases, allied fronts). Even if Tehran prefers to avoid war, the combination of high readiness, compressed decision cycles, and propaganda-driven legitimacy incentives during the 10-Day Dawn (Dahe-ye Fajr) raises the risk of miscalculation.