“Maximum deterrence” posture in response to “maximum pressure.”

During the Dahe-ye Fajr anniversary period (1-11 Feb 2026), the Iranian leadership is signaling a “maximum deterrence” posture in response to “maximum pressure.” Tehran is presenting the standoff as a 'real war' environment, while insisting that any diplomatic channel must be free of threats and 'unreasonable demands.'

In parallel, IRGC-linked media channels and senior commanders emphasize early and heavy retaliation ('from day one') against Israel, U.S. forces, and any state enabling a strike. The combined effect is to raise perceived costs, shorten decision time, and increase the risk of rapid escalation through miscalculation as commanders shift from strategic patience toward more autonomous 'active defense.'

Iranian senior official and IRGC-adjacent messaging deliberately sidelines the protest/regime-change file, while elevating the nuclear–missile–deterrence agenda and portraying the crisis as externally imposed. This narrative shift reduces international attention to internal dissent, supports the framing of continued domestic crackdowns as wartime counter-espionage, and makes external promises of imminent 'help on the way' for internal change appear increasingly detached from Washington's active policy bandwidth.

Agenda displacement and repression legitimacy: Iranian official and IRGC-adjacent messaging largely sidelines the protest/regime-change file, while elevating the nuclear–missile–deterrence agenda and portraying the crisis as externally imposed. This narrative shift reduces international attention to internal dissent, supports the framing of continued domestic crackdowns as wartime counter-espionage, and makes external promises of imminent 'help on the way' for internal change appear increasingly detached from the active policy bandwidth in Washington

Reporting window: 2-3 Feb 2026

Diplomatic Front

Iranian leadership statements framed a narrow opening for talks while explicitly rejecting negotiation under pressure. In comments carried by Iranian channels, Ali Shamkhani argued that Iran is in a state of 'real war' and fully prepared for any scenario, while asserting that deterrence and response cannot be confined to Iran's geography because Israel and the United States are treated as a single operational system. He warned that even limited aggression could cascade into a crisis 'beyond imagination,' while noting that meetings could be possible if proposals are free of threats and reflect 'logical conditions' to 'prevent a catastrophe'.

 To 'prevent a catastrophe'.

Within the same framing, President Masoud Pezeshkian was reported to have instructed the Foreign Minister to keep a dialogue option available only in an environment 'free of threats' and away from 'unreasonable demands' - positioning diplomacy as a tool to avoid escalation without conceding under coercion.

Araghchi also executed a rapid regional outreach cycle, separate phone calls with the foreign ministers of Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, Oman, Pakistan, and Turkey, to brief them on Tehran’s red lines and press for what Iranian readouts described as “responsible management” to prevent the region from sliding into a wider war.. In parallel public remarks, Araghchi reiterated that “negotiation under threat” is not viable and stressed that regional states broadly view military intimidation as destabilizing. He also noted ongoing contacts with Gulf partners amid reports that some states would not permit their airspace to be used for an attack. Iranian coverage of the Saudi-Iran call similarly warned of the “dangerous consequences” of any further escalation and emphasized a shared responsibility among regional states to preserve stability, messaging consistent with Tehran’s effort to mobilize neighbors against enabling U.S. or Israeli action.

The Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasized external alignment messaging, highlighting ongoing coordination with China and Russia and noting a recent trip by the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council to Russia. This line is consistent with a broader effort to demonstrate strategic depth and deter a strike by signaling international backing or coordination.

Iranian Telegram channels additionally amplified claims attributed to external reporting about a prospective Istanbul channel, described as having two tracks (nuclear issues and constraints on the missile program). These claims should be treated as unconfirmed; however, their amplification serves Tehran's signaling objectives by portraying indirect engagement while contesting missile-related demands as unacceptable.

Military Front

On the military side, IRGC-aligned commentary is stressing immediacy and scope. A former deputy coordinator of the IRGC Intelligence Organization was cited as saying the Armed Forces have prepared 'surprises' and that if the enemy 'makes a mistake,' the response would not be delayed - heavy strikes would begin from the first day against Israeli targets, U.S. assets, and any other country that enables an attack or threatens Iran's internal security. The same messaging also folds domestic unrest into the external confrontation narrative, describing protest activity as a product of enemy 'illusions' and coercive pressure.

Tasnim-affiliated feeds circulated messaging intended to underscore quantitative and qualitative growth in Iran's missile capabilities since the opening day of the prior confrontation cycle, reinforcing a mirror-deterrence posture in which Tehran publicizes readiness and response options in parallel with U.S. movements.

Maritime signaling is being used to reinforce deterrence at the theater level. Mashregh, citing a Kayhan commentary line, reported an announced Iran-China-Russia naval drill in or near the Strait of Hormuz in close proximity to the USS Abraham Lincoln - framed as a preemptive deterrent signal and a reminder of Iran's ability to impose risk on key chokepoints during a crisis.

With U.S. carrier strike groups (including the USS Abraham Lincoln) operating in the vicinity, the IRGC Navy (IRGCN) has deployed hundreds of Swarm-Capable Fast Attack Craft (FAC) equipped with anti-ship missiles and Ababil 2 drones, Unmanned Surface Vehicles, maritime IEDs (MIEDs), or Remote-Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs). These units are trained for "hybrid Swarm Warfare," designed to overwhelm the defensive perimeters of high-value U.S. naval assets in the restricted waters of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. 

Operationally, the most acute near-term risk to U.S. forces is a layered retaliatory concept that combines missile and UAV volume with asymmetric naval pressure. Iranian messaging and reporting refer to saturation-style strike logic - large salvos of ballistic missiles and loitering munitions intended to stress defensive intercept capacity - coupled with swarming tactics using fast attack craft and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to force high-value U.S. ships to expend limited defensive munitions and create openings for follow-on strikes.

Iran plans to overwhelm the sophisticated defenses of U.S. warships using a "quantity over quality" strategy known as Hybrid Swarming. Instead of traditional naval battles, they would launch dozens of small, inexpensive, high-speed boats simultaneously from different directions. Many of these are now AI-guided "kamikaze" drone boats (OWA-USVs) that don't require a human pilot. These drones use onboard "computer vision" to recognize the shape of a U.S. ship, allowing them to strike even if their GPS or radio signals are jammed. The goal is to "choke" the ship’s defensive systems: by forcing a billion-dollar Destroyer to waste its limited ammunition on a swarm of cheap drones, the ship eventually becomes "empty" and vulnerable to a final, lethal missile strike.

AI-guided Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) represent a significant evolution in the IRGCN's asymmetric doctrine and aim to address the "human cost" of asymmetric warfare while exponentially increasing the lethality of its "Swarm Doctrine." IRGCN utilizes a "lead-follow" architecture. A few manned Fast Attack Craft (FAC) act as command-and-control hubs, while dozens of One-Way Attack USVs (OWA-USVs)- often based on the Zulfiqar ( short-range, solid-fuel ballistic missile , SRBM) or Ya-Mahdi (Long-range naval cruise missile)- hulls act as the kinetic strikers.

Swarm Doctrine

The regime also continues to frame escalation as multi-front by linking direct Iranian capabilities with proxy or partner responses across the 'Axis of Resistance.' In a conflict scenario, Tehran messaging suggests synchronized pressure against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria alongside maritime and long-range strike activity, increasing the probability that a limited trigger event would expand into a wider, harder-to-control regional exchange.

Araghchi’s rhetoric regarding the "Axis of Resistance" indicates that the military threat is multi-front. In the event of a confrontation, U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria face an immediate increase in drone and rocket attacks from localized militias, synchronized with direct launches from Iranian territory.

What to Watch

Across both fronts, Tehran's core objective appears to be deterrence through cost imposition while preserving a conditional diplomatic off-ramp. The regime is aligning itself rhetorically with the narrow U.S. demand of 'no nuclear weapons' while treating missiles and regional alliances as non-negotiable, aiming to extract sanctions relief without conceding its conventional and regional posture. Another effect is agenda displacement: the more the public discourse centers on nuclear weapons, missiles, and strike prevention, the more Tehran can treat protest activity as a background issue and justify coercive containment as 'national defense'.

The Iranian leadership is signaling a “maximum deterrence” posture in response to “maximum pressure.” By echoing President Trump’s demand of “no nuclear weapons” while simultaneously threatening to hold every U.S. base in the region at risk, Tehran appears to be seeking sanctions relief without conceding its conventional capabilities or regional influence.

Iran is pursuing a “mirror deterrence” approach: as U.S. forces reposition, Tehran publicizes corresponding response options to convey readiness and raise perceived costs. The principal risk to U.S. forces is a shift from strategic patience to active defense, in which commanders operate with wider latitude to respond to perceived provocations. Taken together—Araghchi’s diplomatic defiance and the IRGC’s operational mobilization—current signaling suggests preparation for a high-intensity, short-duration clash intended to impose significant U.S. casualties and accelerate political pressure for de-escalation and withdrawal.

The principal escalation risk is the combination of compressed timelines (driven by the U.S. force posture and Dahe-ye Fajr political symbolism) and a shift toward more autonomous operational responses. Indicators to watch include additional public warnings that explicitly list host-state basing locations as targets, increased naval live-fire or exercise activity near Hormuz, and further amplification of 'two-track' negotiation narratives that set missile constraints as a red line.

Iranian messaging that collapses Israel and the United States into a single operational target set increases the likelihood that Israeli critical infrastructure and military nodes will be threatened early in a crisis, even if the initial trigger is framed as a U.S.-Iran exchange. This increases the risk of rapid horizontal escalation from a Gulf-centered confrontation into a broader regional conflict.

This brief reflects Iranian open-source messaging and amplification patterns; some claims (e.g., the Istanbul channel details) are treated as unconfirmed reporting but remain relevant as indicators of the narrative environment and negotiating posture Tehran seeks to shape.

Iranian channels are likely to continue pairing conditional engagement language with cost-imposition signaling, especially through naval and missile deterrence themes during the remainder of Dahe-ye Fajr. A sharp increase in explicit base-by-base target lists, new references to 'first-day' strike sequencing, or heightened Hormuz live-fire activity would be the clearest open-source indicators that Tehran is preparing for a faster transition from signaling to execution.