Jaish al-Adl persists, defying Iran’s crackdown with lethal consistency.

Summary

Despite sustained and intensified counterinsurgency efforts by Iranian security forces, Jaish al-Adl continues to carry out regular and deadly attacks against regime targets in Sistan and Baluchestan Province. The group's operations-from coordinated ambushes to solo martyrdom attacks—demonstrate its resilience, tactical adaptability, and persistent operational presence.

The recent attacks in Chabahar (July 2025) and Mirjaveh (September 2024) confirm that Jaish al-Adl maintains both ideological momentum and local support, enabling it to strike at high-value Iranian security personnel despite heavy surveillance and pressure. The insurgency remains a significant challenge to Iran’s internal stability in its southeastern frontier.

**

On July 11, 2025, the Sunni Baloch insurgent group Jaish al-Adl ("Army of Justice") carried out a deadly assault against Iranian security forces in the southeastern city of Chabahar, located in Sistan and Baluchestan Province. The group claimed responsibility for the attack shortly after its execution through a public communique stating that Abdul Khalil Khurram, a lone militant from Jaish al-Adl’s "Fedayeen of Divine Justice" battalion, ambushed a patrol convoy belonging to the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA). The convoy, composed of two Hilux vehicles and a Samand sedan, was attacked with automatic weapons. According to the group’s statement, all passengers in one of the Hilux vehicles were killed. The attacker continued fighting for nearly two hours, reportedly killing and injuring a total of seven personnel from FARAJA and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) before being killed in the firefight (video).

he perpetrator of the operation was next to one of the damaged Toyotas

The statement added that two days earlier, on July 9, "a five-member team of its mujahid forces was ambushed and surrounded in a pre-planned operation by IRGC and IRGC intelligence forces in the vicinity of Chabahar city. A fierce battle ensued in which all five mujahideen were martyred after hours of heroic resistance and inflicting casualties on several IRGC members".

Jaish al-Adl Claims Responsibility for Chabahar Attack

The Iranian government officially acknowledged the attacks. Provincial police authorities confirmed the deaths of three FARAJA officers and the wounding of four others. The national police issued a statement reporting that one of the insurgents was killed and another wounded. According to their account, FARAJA's rapid-response tactical units pursued the attackers, and the area was returned to complete security control. A public funeral ceremony for the slain officers was held in Chabahar, attended by senior officials, tribal elders, and a wide range of local residents.

Funeral Ceremony for Three FARAJA Martyrs in Chabahar

These attacks are the latest in a series of armed operations by Jaish al-Adl, an insurgent group active in southeastern Iran. Formed in 2012 by remnants of the dismantled JundAllah network, Jaish al-Adl claims to defend the rights of Iran's Sunni Baloch minority, who have long reported systemic discrimination and repression by the Shi’a-dominated regime in Tehran. The group’s tactics range from small-arms ambushes and IED attacks to kidnappings and suicide bombings.

On July 8, 2023, four Jaish al-Adl militants equipped with small arms and suicide belts attacked Police Station No. 16 in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan province. During the assault, two of the attackers detonated their suicide belts, resulting in the deaths of two Iranian police officers. All four militants were killed in the operation. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility, framing the attack as part of its broader campaign linked to the events of “Bloody Friday” in Zahedan.

On September 12, 2024, Jaish al-Adl ambushed Iranian border guards near Mirjaveh, close to the Pakistani border. The ambush resulted in the deaths of three members of the Border Guard Command. The Iranian government confirmed the attack and held official funeral ceremonies for the fallen personnel.

Other notable incidents include a February 2019 suicide bombing using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) that targeted an IRGC transport bus on the Zahedan–Khash road, killing 27 IRGC members.

In 2021, five IRGC members were killed and three others captured in an ambush near Saravan, also attributed to Jaish al-Adl. In May 2025, five Iranian border guards were killed in an unclaimed attack along the frontier, consistent in method and location with Jaish al-Adl's prior operations.

The latest operation highlights both the intention and capability of Jaish al-Adl to continue waging a sustained insurgency against Iranian security forces in the southeastern region. The group has clearly demonstrated its capability, as it is willing to carry out martyrdom-style attacks, with its fighters showing no fear of being killed in combat. Just as significantly, its intention is to persist in targeting the full spectrum of Iranian security institutions, particularly the national police (FARAJA), border guards, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The strategic location of attacks, such as along the Chabahar coastal highway, indicates a deliberate effort to disrupt state authority in high-value logistical and military zones. As long as grievances among the Sunni Baluch population remain unresolved and the group's networks remain intact, Jaish al-Adl is likely to retain both the capability and the will to strike again, posing a continuous and evolving threat to Iranian internal stability.

The Baloch minority continues to pose a persistent and multifaceted challenge to the Islamic Republic, particularly in the restive Sistan and Baluchestan province. Deep-rooted grievances over political marginalization, religious discrimination, and economic neglect have fueled support for insurgent groups like Jaish al-Adl.

Jaish al-Adl maintains logistical and ideological ties with Sunni groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While direct operational cooperation is limited, the group is believed to have access to safe havens and support networks in Pakistan’s Balochistan province and occasionally in border regions of Afghanistan. These areas provide training, recruitment, and smuggling routes. Jaish al-Adl shares ideological affinities with groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and elements of the former Haqqani Network, though it operates independently. These cross-border ties enhance its resilience and threat potential against Iranian security forces.

Iran is highly sensitive to the presence of Jaish al-Adl’s support networks and safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan, viewing them as a direct threat to its national security. In recent years, Iran has adopted a multi-pronged approach to address this issue, with particular emphasis on cross-border attacks into Pakistani territory.

Iranian officials have repeatedly pressured Islamabad to crack down on Jaish al-Adl’s operations in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. However, amid growing frustration, Iran has on several occasions conducted limited precision strikes inside Pakistani territory, targeting suspected militant camps and hideouts. Notably, in January 2024, Iran launched missile and drone strikes against what it described as “terrorist strongholds” in Pakistan, prompting a brief diplomatic crisis.