Iran Signals Escalation Readiness While Testing the U.S.–Israel Alliance

The Iranian leadership is currently executing a coordinated, multi-pillar strategy designed to navigate escalating pressures from the United States and Israel. Central to this strategy is a categorical refusal to compromise on national defense assets, with senior officials explicitly declaring that Iran's missile program remains non-negotiable and outside the scope of any potential dialogue with the Trump administration.

Tehran is simultaneously pursuing a "wedge strategy" aimed at isolating Israel from its primary ally. By popularizing the narrative of "Peace Trump-style" and documenting alleged Israeli violations of regional ceasefires, Iranian state media attempts to frame the Israeli government as the sole obstacle to the U.S. President’s stated goal of regional stability. Tehran further leaned into this wedge narrative by amplifying reports of a tense Netanyahu–Trump exchange over Iran and by publicly warning President Trump against Netanyahu-led “misinformation.”]

On the domestic front, the regime is leveraging the 22 Bahman (Revolution Day) rallies to project an image of absolute national unity and "million-strong" public support. This display of internal cohesion is used by officials like Foreign Minister Araghchi to signal to the West that the Islamic Republic's core principles and "honor" are backed by a popular mandate and therefore not subject to concessions.

Overall, Iran’s current confrontational posture against the United States is defined by four strategic behaviors:

1 . Time-buying diplomacy, where negotiations are treated as a secondary tool while the national nuclear/missiles agenda proceeds independently.

2 . Credible military threats, centered on the IRGC's declaration that national security is an inviolable "red line" and the celebration of perceived U.S. strategic retreats in the region.

3 . Active regional diplomacy, characterized by high-level coordination with the "Resistance Axis," such as recent meetings with Hamas leadership in Doha and regional leaders (Qatar, Oman, Turkey)

4. Domestic consolidation, utilizing state-organized events and social engineering projects to suppress dissent and demonstrate a unified home front, control, and the suppression of dissent under the guise of "national security".

Iran views the Oman talks as a leverage tool, not a compromise forum, aimed at buying time, extracting phased concessions, and diluting the credibility of a unified U.S.–Israel military threat. In parallel, Tehran is likely to pursue a wedge strategy between Netanyahu and Washington whi

le activating regional pressure levers (notably Turkey and Qatar) to reinforce de-escalation narratives, complicate U.S. basing/coalition politics, and raise the perceived cost of alignment with Israeli timelines.

Iran is also likely to use the extended negotiation timeline to restore internal calm and consolidate regime stability after the recent protest wave—buying time to tighten security controls, deter renewed mobilization, and project domestic resilience while external talks reduce immediate pressure for escalation.

February 12, 2026 10:00

The dominant Iranian line seeks to (a) portray Israel as sabotaging U.S.–Iran diplomacy and attempting to drag Washington into confrontation, while (b) reiterating deterrence red lines and (c) sustaining the securitized framing of internal unrest.

I. The "Wedge" Strategy: Netanyahu vs. Trump’s "Peace"

Iranian state media and diplomatic representatives are working to portray Netanyahu as a liability to President Trump’s regional goals. Iranian state-affiliated outlets and senior officials intensified messaging around Netanyahu’s Washington consultations and his meeting with President Trump.

• Israeli objectives incompatible with U.S. interests: Iran’s MFA (Telegram) told President Trump to avoid being “misinformed” by Netanyahu’s narrative and claimed Israel has sought since 2015 to sabotage any diplomatic solution—explicitly framing Israeli objectives as incompatible with U.S. interests.

Araghchi posted on X denying an "Israel Hayom"… ("Miriam Adelson’s mouthpiece,") report claiming Iran secretly executed thousands of protesters/detainees while misleading the US during nuclear-related talks. He noted the timing published right before Netanyahu's White House meeting with Trump, and urged readers to question who really benefits from - and who is deceiving in- the narrative.

•  Framing Israel as the Aggressor: To undermine the image of a unified U.S.-Israeli peace effort, Iranian reports have popularized the term "Peace Trump-style", contrasting it with the claim that "the Israeli army has violated the provisions of the [Gaza] agreement at least 1,300 times".

 • Publicizing U.S. Internal Opposition: State media emphasized domestic American friction, noting that "dozens of anti-war activists and Gaza supporters gathered in front of the White House" to protest Netanyahu’s presence, suggesting that his visit is a source of instability within the U.S.

II. Military Readiness and the Narrative of U.S. Retreat

The Iranian military is using recent regional shifts to bolster its narrative of strength and the inevitability of American withdrawal.

Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of Iran's Defense Council, warned that any military “adventurism” against Iran would be met with a “crushing” response. The cost of any miscalculation will be severe," and stressed that Israeli military action depends on direct U.S. backing—framing Washington as accountable for escalation risk.

•  Celebrating the Al-Tanf Withdrawal: Iranian news outlets are framing the end of the U.S. presence at a key Syrian base as validation of the "Resistance Axis" military pressure and tactical success in forcing an American retreat toward Jordan: "The U.S. military finally evacuated the Al-Tanf base in Syria after 11 years... And retreated towards Jordan".

• The IRGC's "Red Line": Security-focused channels have issued a stark warning regarding domestic and regional stability, declaring: "The security of the people is the red line of the IRGC."

 • Ideological Fortification: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi used the mass 22 Bahman Revolution Day rallies to signal that military and national posture remains rigid, stating: "The million-strong presence... Shows that dignity and honor are not negotiable… sincerely hope the coming year will be a Year of Peace and Tranquility, with Dialogue Prevailing over War. Our preference is diplomacy, and a deal on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is achievable, but only if fair and balanced. To this end, Iran will not shy away from defending its sovereignty, whatever the cost." In typical Revolution Day rallies in Tehran, it is common for the state to organize elaborate propaganda displays designed to symbolize the "decline" of Western powers.

III. Red Lines in Negotiations: Missiles and Secret Diplomacy

Despite Trump’s claim that "negotiations with Iran will continue," senior Iranian officials are publicly narrowing the scope of what is on the table.

 • Exclusion of Missile Programs: Shamkhani said Iran’s missile program is a non-negotiable “red line,” while signaling conditional openness to progress if talks are “realistic” and free of “extremist demands”—implicitly rejecting any ‘zero enrichment’ / dismantlement framing. Representative Mojtaba Ferdousipour made it clear that Iran’s deterrent capabilities are off-limits, stating: "The missile issue has no place in negotiations with the United States". Media sources emphasize the non-negotiable status of Iran's missile program as a cornerstone of national defense.

•  Denial of Secret Communications: Addressing rumors of back-channel diplomacy, Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stated flatly: "We had no letter to the American side".

•  Refusal to "Wait" on Diplomacy: A representative from the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) reinforced the idea that Iran will not be held hostage by the diplomatic process, arguing: "The country should not remain waiting for negotiations... negotiation is only one of the tools for securing national interests".

IV. Domestic Suppression and Social Engineering

The regime curbs internal pressures by asserting its legitimacy through state-organized events and "social vitality" projects.

•  Repression-through-securitization reinforced: DefaPress’ security roundup highlighted ongoing security operations (including arrests of “terrorist” elements) and re-amplified narratives around the “recent unrest,” including reporting on treatment of large numbers of those injured during disturbances at IRGC-linked medical facilities, supporting the regime’s effort to shift protest discourse into a counter-terrorism frame.

•  Legitimacy via Mobilization: High-ranking officials are pointing to the state-mandated Revolution Day rallies as a total rebuttal to dissent. Araghchi framed these rallies as a "message" to the world that the Iranian public stands behind the regime's firmest policies.

•  Management of Social Space: To address social unrest while maintaining gender-based restrictions, Vice President Shina Ansari announced that the "development of women's parks is a priority of the government" to ensure "social vitality" within the regime's ideological framework.

·       Presidential Provincial Visits: President Pezeshkian recently arrived in Golestan Province for a one-day trip focused on provincial programs and direct engagement with local populations. He also made high-profile appearances at the Fajr Film Festival, attempting to project an image of cultural normalcy and state support for the arts.

·       Infrastructure and Health Reforms

o   Housing: The government reported providing National Housing Movement loans to 7,731 applicants in Semnan province alone.

o   Health: Health Minister Zafarghandi announced the systematic implementation of a "referral system" and "family medicine" as the primary step for reforming the national health structure.

o   Addressing Environmental Crisis: The Minister of Cultural Heritage warned that land subsidence is now a major threat to historical sites, particularly in Isfahan and Semnan, signaling that the state is shifting focus to environmental stability as a component of national security.

• Security Context: While the sources focus on the "festive" nature of recent days, the IRGC’s insistence that "security is a red line" serves as a standing threat to any elements seeking to reignite protests during these high-profile provincial visits by President Pezeshkian.

From Tehran’s perspective, the Oman track is not a “mutual compromise” channel but a controlled arena to convert pressure into leverage. Iran assumes Washington’s willingness to sit down reflects political urgency, so it aims to widen the gap between U.S. intentions and U.S. capabilities: keep talks alive to slow momentum toward military action, test U.S. patience, and extract phased concessions without paying an irreversible price.

At the same time, Tehran reads the U.S.–Israel military threat as real but constraint-bound, effective mainly if it appears unified, time-urgent, and credible-so Iran’s play is to blunt that credibility: project calm and reasonableness in the room while signaling retaliatory capacity outside it, and seek to introduce friction between American risk tolerance and Israeli red lines. In parallel, Tehran will try to drive a wedge between Netanyahu and Washington by framing Israeli preferences as escalation-prone and politically self-interested, while presenting itself as the “rational” party whose demands are limited and negotiable if the U.S. distances itself from Israeli timelines.

Tehran will also work to strengthen regional pressure levers on the U.S.—quietly mobilizing sympathetic or transactional intermediaries, such as Oman, Turkey,

and Qatar, to amplify de-escalation messaging, complicate U.S. basing and coalition politics, and reinforce the idea that Washington incurs broader regional costs if it aligns too closely with Israeli options. In this logic, rhetoric is cheap and reversible; the key is to preserve core assets, concede only when it strengthens Iran’s position, and use delay, ambiguity, and incrementalism to emerge from the process looking stronger rather than compliant.

Beyond external leverage, Tehran will likely treat the protracted Oman process as a domestic stabilization window. As long as talks remain active, the regime can frame tensions as “managed,” lower the perceived immediacy of crisis, and concentrate on reasserting internal control—disrupting protest networks, reinforcing deterrence through selective enforcement, and stabilizing elite cohesion—so that it emerges from the negotiation period with a quieter street and a more secure governing posture