Managed Discord: Iran’s Strategic Use of Internal Debate to Lure the West

July 24, 2025 21:30

Executive Summary

In the aftermath of the June 2025 war with Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran is deliberately projecting an image of internal political debate to lure the West back into negotiations. President Pezeshkian’s controversial interview with Tucker Carlson, followed by orchestrated backlash from hardline factions, reflects a calculated attempt to portray a pragmatic, divided Iran. However, these apparent rifts do not indicate any shift in core ideological commitments.

Instead, they are consistent with Iran’s historic strategy of using managed pluralism to manipulate Western perceptions, extract sanctions relief, and preserve its revolutionary identity. The regime’s core institutions—led by the Supreme Leader and the IRGC—remain firmly in control of nuclear and security policy and continue to prioritize deterrence, regional subversion, and ideological survival.

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Iran’s Internal Political Arena After the War with Israel

Following the June 2025 war with Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran is attempting to present a picture of internal recalibration, especially in its approach toward the West. While the Supreme Leader has called for national unity and a unified front against foreign adversaries, growing criticism of President Masoud Pezeshkian's public messaging, particularly his interview with American commentator Tucker Carlson, has intensified domestic tensions and exposed alleged factional rifts. These developments are essentially part of a familiar Iranian strategy aimed at projecting controlled pluralism to encourage Western engagement without actually compromising the regime's core ideological framework.

Domestic Criticism of Pezeshkian’s Interview with Tucker Carlson

In mid-July 2025, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian gave an exclusive interview to American commentator Tucker Carlson. While the president’s office framed the interview as an opportunity to improve Iran’s international image, it quickly sparked significant domestic backlash across Iran’s political spectrum. The main criticisms centered on the timing of the interview, its content, and the broader strategic implications of Pezeshkian’s remarks on sensitive topics, such as the nuclear program and relations with the United States.

The leader urges unity

A group of 24 Iranian parliamentarians issued a formal letter criticizing the president’s remarks as "unilateral and weak," arguing that he presented Iran’s foreign policy posture as passive in the face of Western hostility. They stated that his tone was “disappointing” and that such an approach risked undermining Iran’s strategic deterrence.

One particularly controversial moment was Pezeshkian’s statement that the slogan “Death to America” did not mean death to the American people or officials. This led to outrage from the Paydari faction in parliament, which issued a statement demanding that the president reaffirm loyalty to the Supreme Leader’s guidance and clearly defend existing fatwas. “He should have clearly supported the fatwa to reinforce Iran’s position,” their statement said (Entekhab.ir).

The Iranian mouthpiece "Kayhan" criticized resident Pezeshkian's interview, arguing that the president presented a contradictory and embarrassing position. The criticism focuses on the fact that Pezeshkian, on the one hand, stated that "America dropped bombs on the negotiating table," yet immediately afterward expressed a willingness to return to negotiations without conditions "What logic is there in negotiating with a country that officially attacked our soil, gave Israel permission to attack, assassinated our military commanders, and killed innocent scientists?"

The newspaper argues that the only condition Pezeshkian set - that Israel should not be allowed to attack again during talks - is insufficient, demanding instead: an end to hostility, admission of crimes, payment of compensation, and absolute, verifiable guarantees adding that discussion of the nuclear deal gives enemies the impression that Iran is again willing to negotiate under pressure, which weakens its deterrent posture. "Kayhan" concludes by arguing that Iran should negotiate from a position of strength and deterrence, rather than appearing eager to return to talks with parties that have broken previous agreements and attacked Iran during negotiations.

Moreover, according to a report published in Fararu, critics from across the political spectrum questioned the strategic wisdom of the interview’s timing. They argued that the discussion with Carlson should have taken place either long before the war, to serve as a deterrent, or after the conflict, once Iran had demonstrated strength. Conducting the interview in the immediate postwar period, they asserted, sent mixed messages to both international adversaries and domestic stakeholders, weakening Iran’s diplomatic leverage.

Other voices noted that the president’s remarks failed to address fundamental red-line issues such as the status of Iran’s missile program and the fatwa against Trump. Javan newspaper, affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, wrote: "We are now an angry nation and cannot speak as we did in days of peace and tranquility. Showing the nation's anger is the essence of rationality." The newspaper took issue with Pezeshkian's claim that the fatwa of enmity against Trump  (mohareb) has no connection to the Iranian government and the leader of the Islamic Republic, suggesting that the president's attempt to distance the establishment from religious rulings was inappropriate given the current circumstances.

Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of Kayhan, stated that contrary to the president’s claims, "everyone knows that such information is flawed and misleading. The marajiʿ (sources of emulation) have indicated that any offense against the Supreme Leader or the institution of religious authority constitutes moharebeh—war against God. Individuals like Trump, Netanyahu, and other officials of the filthy and illegitimate Zionist regime fall under this ruling, and their sentence is capital punishment.”. By distancing himself from the jurisprudential consensus on this issue, the president not only undermines the authority of the marjaʿiyyah and vilayat-e faqih but also weakens Iran’s ideological resolve in the face of its enemies.

“By questioning the fatwa, the president distorts reality and betrays the essence of the Islamic Revolution.” — Hossein Shariatmadari

Other critics accused the president’s team of failing to consult with the Supreme National Security Council before conducting the interview, thus signaling a readiness to engage with the United States, which they suggested was a sign of desperation rather than strength.

Conservative journalist Abdolreza Hadizadeh posted on "X": "Pezeshkian's conversation with Tucker Carlson was embarrassing and shameful. If the president can't protect national interests and explain the country's positions, why do you arrange interviews for him? Are the Political Deputy of the President's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Center for Strategic Studies incapable of preparing the president's talking points for foreign interviews?"

In addition to these content-based critiques, several media analysts noted technical flaws in the production of the interview. Fararu highlighted poor lighting, framing, and audio quality, which further weakened the intended message and conveyed a lack of professionalism.

Recalibrating Iran’s messaging

The 12-Day "Sacred Defence" War has deepened longstanding fissures within the Iranian political establishment, as so-called “pragmatic conservatives” attempt to reclaim influence over foreign policy and mitigate the ultra-hardliners' resistance to any diplomatic engagement with the West. In a July 23 article, the reformist newspaper Ham Mihan highlighted the recent activities of two senior advisors to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani, former Speaker of the Majlis (parliament), and Ali Akbar Velayati,  Senior Advisor to the Supreme Leader for International Affairs, as part of this effort. The article highlighted Larijani’s visit to Moscow on July 20, during which he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Iran’s nuclear program, regional security, and defense cooperation. This visit was widely interpreted as part of a broader campaign to secure renewed backing from strategic allies and reframe Iran’s postwar diplomatic posture.

Reinforcing this perception, Velayati suggested that postwar stability may necessitate adjustments. "Safeguarding national cohesion, as underscored by the Supreme Leader, may require the government to revise certain social policies and place real, tangible emphasis on public satisfaction. The people have demonstrated their resilience; now it is the officials who must rise to the occasion. Traditional methods are no longer adequate for a post-war society.

Earlier, on July 14, Velayati made headlines by declaring that “We do not oppose negotiations that are held without preconditions, provided that the Islamic Republic’s red lines are preserved,” a position directly at odds with hardliner demands that Washington label Israel the aggressor, investigate American involvement in the war, and offer security guarantees and reparations. He added that “they [the Americans] demand that Iran abandon uranium enrichment, but this is one of our red lines. If negotiations are conditioned upon halting enrichment, then such talks will certainly not take place.”

Velayati’s remarks reflect the prevailing consensus within Iran’s ruling elite: nuclear capability is essential to the regime’s survival and ideological identity. Even as Tehran flirts with the language of diplomacy, the strategic bedrock remains one of resistance over compromise. This view was echoed across several conservative media outlets, which reiterated that Iran’s postwar diplomacy must be driven by deterrence, not appeasement.

These pragmatic signals, exemplified by Larijani’s outreach to Russia and Velayati’s nuanced openness to negotiation, also served to contrast with the tone struck by President Pezeshkian during his interview with Tucker Carlson. In that interview, Pezeshkian projected conciliatory language toward the United States, a posture that drew sharp criticism from hardliners. The efforts by Larijani and Velayati thus represent an attempt to recalibrate Iran’s messaging, maintaining the potential for engagement while firmly asserting strategic red lines and counterbalancing both the president’s rhetoric and the rigidity of hardliners.

Larijani and Velayati recalibrate Iran’s messaging.

During the same period, Defense Minister General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with his Russian counterpart Andrei Belousov in Moscow. The two reportedly discussed enhanced military cooperation, which aligns with Iran’s broader effort to compensate for deficiencies exposed during the war. These visits underscored Iran’s effort to revive support from strategic partners and balance its internal diplomatic narrative.

Despite the appearance of internal division (July 21), public disagreements serve a tactical purpose rather than indicating a genuine policy shift. The Islamic Republic has previously used the appearance of factionalism to attract Western concessions. By allowing figures like Pezeshkian to speak in favor of diplomacy while others insist on red lines, Iran manufactures the illusion of a domestic struggle between moderates and hardliners.

The reality remains that Iran’s revolutionary institutions, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Supreme Leader’s Office, control key aspects of national security policy, including the nuclear program. These bodies have shown no inclination to compromise on the regime's ideological pillars: exporting the revolution, resisting the West's presence in the region, and pursuing strategic deterrence through missile and nuclear capability.

The post-war debate about diplomacy is therefore less about genuine internal reform and more about external signaling. Tehran is again testing whether it can once again manipulate Western perception through managed pluralism.

The West should approach these overtures with extreme caution, recognizing that Iran's familiar rhetoric of moderation is a tactical façade. In practice, the Islamic Republic remains committed to its overarching strategic goals: advancing a clandestine military nuclear program, developing long-range missile capabilities designed to carry nuclear warheads, and sustaining the export of its revolutionary ideology through regional subversion and proxy warfare. Far from signaling genuine reform, these gestures are calculated moves to gain time, reduce external pressure, and continue pursuing Tehran’s long-term agenda under the cover of national dialogue.